A Brief History of the Tujia: The Tujia in the Early Years of New China (Part 3)
III. The Economy of Tujia Areas in the Early Years of New China — Due to imperialist plunder and wartime destruction, Tujia areas suffered economic depression and hardship. To rapidly restore the economy and stabilize people's lives, China began reconstruction efforts.
This article has been compiled from historical materials on 'Zhangjiajie Tour Guide Network' (33519.com · Specialty Foods / Cuisine / Customs section). Prices, business hours, administrative divisions, and statistical data mentioned in the text may already be outdated. Before traveling, please refer to the latest announcements from merchants, scenic areas, and local competent authorities; the parts involving folk legends and folk customs are local historical and cultural anecdotes, provided for cultural reference.
III. The Economy of Tujia Areas in the Early Period After the Founding of New China
In the early period after the founding of the People's Republic of China, due to long-term plunder by imperialism and destruction by war, like other regions, the Tujia areas had a depressed economy and people lived in hardship. In order to quickly restore the national economy and develop production so that people's lives could be stabilized as soon as possible, China began planned economic construction, and the Tujia areas also developed accordingly.
(1) Recovery of the National Economy (1949-1952)
From 1949 to 1952 was the period of national economic recovery. In order to escape economic difficulties, promote sound development of the national economy, and maintain social stability, during this period China mainly adopted the following measures.
1. Establishing the Leading Position of the State-Owned Economy
First, bureaucratic capital was confiscated and transformed. This mainly meant confiscating enterprises operated by the Kuomintang government and enterprises operated by major Kuomintang bureaucratic capitalists. In order to ensure the smooth takeover of bureaucratic capital, the people's government formulated a series of relevant measures, the most important of which were 'do not smash the old institutions' and 'retain the original staff, original salaries, and original system'. In Tujia areas, for example, banks in Laifeng County and Youyang County, and the post and telecommunications bureau and transportation enterprises in Longshan County, were successively confiscated by the people's government during the War of Resistance Against Japan and after the founding of New China. In order to ensure the smooth takeover of bureaucratic capital, the people's governments in Tujia areas, in accordance with relevant state policies, formulated a series of effective measures, the most important of which were 'do not smash the old institutions' and 'retain the original staff, original salaries, and original system'. After bureaucratic capital was confiscated, its enterprises and property were transferred to state ownership. This enabled the people's political power to directly grasp the lifeline of the national economy and laid an important material foundation for restoring and developing the national economy.
Second, imperialist economic forces in China were eliminated. After the founding of the People's Republic of China, the people's government immediately began to eliminate imperialist aggressive forces in China. The most important measure was recovering the customs, ending imperialist occupation and control of China's customs, thereby blocking imperialist dumping of goods into China and plundering of raw materials, and effectively protecting the development of domestic national industry and commerce.
Third, unified management of foreign trade. Before the founding of the People's Republic of China, the imperialist powers, relying on the unequal treaties signed with the late Qing government, opened treaty ports in our country, controlled our foreign trade, made our import and export trade subordinate to their needs, and plundered the material wealth of all our ethnic groups on a large scale. The local products of the Tujia areas, such as tung oil, tea, and medicinal herbs, were once the main items they vied to plunder. In order to plunder tung oil, American merchants built oil refineries in Yuanling, Hongjiang, Changde, and other places, and the refineries in various places processed 45,000 to 100,000 jin of tung oil each year. In Yongshun County, the tung oil plundered by American merchants reached 2.6 million jin each year. In 1893, British merchants monopolized the Hunan tea market and bought at depressed prices, so that "Chinese merchants had no way to cope, ... and Hunan merchants again lost more than one million taels." After the founding of the People's Republic of China, the people's government implemented foreign trade controls, determined foreign trade according to national interests, and thus grasped the initiative in foreign trade; the foreign trade activities of the Tujia areas received solid guarantees from the state power.
2. Stabilizing finance and prices
In the early period after the founding of New China, the War of Liberation had just ended, industrial output had declined or stopped, agriculture had suffered poor harvests, and in addition the imperialist countries imposed an economic blockade on our country, while domestic private merchants took the opportunity to rush to buy goods, hoard them, and drive up prices, causing financial difficulties and soaring prices in most parts of the country, including the Tujia areas. In 1950, the price index of the Enshi Prefecture in March had risen twofold compared with the beginning of the year, and people suffered deeply from inflation. In order to reverse this situation, the state adopted a series of measures, mainly including:
First, strengthening taxation. In the Tujia areas, the guiding principle was mainly the "Essentials for the Implementation of National Taxation" promulgated by the state at that time, and tax institutions, tax policies, and tax management were unified in accordance with central regulations. In rural areas, the land tax was changed to an agricultural tax, and in order to strike at the landlord class and restrict economic exploitation in the countryside, the Central People's Government also promulgated the "Provisional Regulations on Agricultural Tax in Newly Liberated Areas" and the "Measures for the Implementation of Agricultural Tax," stipulating that the agricultural tax would use a progressive tax system on the amount. The agricultural tax was collected in kind (rice), uniformly collected by the grain departments, and then converted into cash and handed over to the financial departments.
Second, issuing the People's Victory Real-Value Public Bonds. In early 1950, the people's government promulgated the "Decision on Issuing the People's Victory Real-Value Public Bonds," determining that the subscription, repayment of principal, and payment of interest of this batch of bonds would all be calculated in real goods. In April 1950, the Enshi Prefecture and the counties under its administration all established bond sales committees and issued the "People's Victory Real-Value Public Bonds." Because the bonds adopted the principles of "guaranteeing principal in real goods, paying interest on schedule, encouraging savings, and benefiting both public and private," they were welcomed by the Tujia people. For example, Laifeng County was assigned a task of 3,500 units, and some people subscribed 100 units at one time, so that subscriptions greatly exceeded the assigned number; Hefeng County was assigned a task of 2,000 units, and later also overfulfilled it.
Third, cracking down on speculation in gold, silver, and copper coins. In order to limit market price fluctuations caused by gold, silver, and copper coins, the people's governments in the Tujia areas, on the one hand, set deadlines for exchanging the gold yuan notes, silver yuan notes, and other currencies issued by the Kuomintang government, so that the renminbi quickly occupied the market; on the other hand, they issued regulations on the management of gold and silver, announced the prohibition of the free circulation of gold and silver, and had the People's Bank of China offer real-value deposits, take responsibility for posting exchange rates and exchanging them, strictly prohibit illegal gold and silver speculation, and mobilize the broad masses to expose and report it. For example, the Xiangxi Administrative Office strictly prohibited merchants from using silver dollars and copper coins in purchasing and selling activities; Dayong County punished some shops for hoarding salt, refusing to accept renminbi, and trading with silver dollars on the black market; the People's Bank of China in Laifeng County put renminbi into the market, organized the masses to refuse silver dollars, and adopted the policy of allowing private individuals to hold gold and silver, strictly prohibiting their circulation as a measure of value, and permitting exchange at the People's Bank of China. Because the policies were implemented resolutely, speculation in gold, silver, and copper coins was quickly brought under control. For example, from 1950 to 1952, Laifeng County exchanged a total of 1,778.17 grams of gold, 57,252 grams of silver, and 13,532 silver dollars. By the end of 1950, the use of silver dollars in Enshi Prefecture had basically ended, and the renminbi occupied the entire circulation field.
These regulatory measures played a relatively important role in stabilizing market prices. For example, in 1951, after the Enshi Prefectural Office intervened through administrative power and material means, prices fell back relatively quickly; the Enshi industrial and commercial circles also jointly established a price management leading group to negotiate prices for major commodities. In 1952, prices in Enshi Prefecture fell month by month; taking December 1951 prices as the base, the comprehensive price index was 962% in January and 83.2% in December.
3. Establishing state-owned commerce and seizing market leadership
In the early period after the founding of New China, speculative merchants often, for their own interests, disrupted the economic order of the time, causing market chaos and rising prices, seriously damaging social production, and harming people's lives as a result. In order to stop the destructive activities of speculative capital, the measures adopted by the government included:
First, establishing state-owned commerce. At the beginning of the founding of New China, the commercial economy was in a transition between old and new, the market was chaotic, merchants were hesitant and wait-and-see, urban and rural goods could not circulate, and commerce tended toward stagnation. In view of this situation, the government decided to immediately establish state-owned commerce, increase the flow of goods, and drive the development of private commerce. Xianfeng County established its first state-owned store in early 1950, and state-owned trade stores and trade groups were also set up in some township markets. By the end of 1950, the Longshan County trade store had set up trade groups in markets such as Zhaoshi, Ciyan, Jiashi, Miaoshi, Hongyan, Dianfang, Neiqi, and Guitang. In the town of Liye in that county, not only was there a state-owned trade store, but a supply and marketing cooperative was also established in April 1952. In this way, a new situation appeared in Liye in which state-owned stores, collective supply and marketing cooperatives, and private commerce developed simultaneously, and the market showed a new scene of prosperity.
Second, rectifying the commercial market. The government controlled major commodities, cracked down on speculation, stabilized prices, and strengthened the purchase and transport of major daily necessities such as grain, yarn and cloth, and salt, thereby ensuring market supply. At the end of 1949, rumors once spread in Yongshun county town that bandits had surrounded Yongshun so tightly that not even water could get through, and that salt transport was blocked. These rumors made people panic, and they rushed to buy salt, so that for a time the salt supply was very tight. The Yongshun Trade Company immediately transported salt from Wangcun, and fourteen salt boats quickly arrived in Yongshun, and the salt price was quickly stabilized. In order to stabilize market prices and rectify market order, the Enshi Prefectural Office also actively adopted many measures: for example, it organized forces to collect grain from various places and sell it at low prices in key areas to guarantee the basic grain needs of residents; on November 30, 1950, the prefectural office instructed the gradual transformation of "yan'erke" (a type of peddler linking urban and rural goods), registered them, stipulated the types of goods they could deal in and their business rules, prohibited adulteration in mountain goods, prohibited forced introductions and unreasonable commission demands, prohibited rigging the scales, and required fair prices; the trade company sold materials in large quantities at key points (such as cotton yarn, cotton cloth, and native cloth) to help stabilize prices and wage a tit-for-tat struggle against lawless private merchants. In 1951, speculators in Xuan'en County also created rumors of a salt shortage, and panic buying appeared in the market many times; the local government and commercial departments quickly adjusted the supply of 5,874 dan of salt, and the retail price immediately dropped from 0.28 yuan per jin to 0.26 yuan.
Third, strengthening market management. The main methods were: implementing industrial and commercial registration, and not allowing business to open without approval; strictly managing market transactions, establishing exchanges, and implementing centralized trading of major materials; controlling market prices and protecting state-owned store posted prices from interference; banning speculative activities, handling speculators according to the seriousness of the circumstances, and protecting legitimate private industry and commerce.
Fourth, actively adjusting public-private relations. On the one hand, adjust public-private industrial and commercial relations. For private industry, the main approach was to expand processing orders for private industry and the purchase of its products, gradually bring private industry into the track of the state plan, make it produce according to the needs of the national economy, and allow it to obtain reasonable profits through processing fees and goods prices; in commerce, adjust the scope of operations and prices of public and private commerce, appropriately expand the variety of goods handled by private commerce in terms of scope, and under the principle of ensuring price stability, tighten state-owned retail commerce; in price policy, appropriately adjust the price ratios between retail and wholesale, between producing areas and marketing areas, between seasons, and between raw materials and finished products, so that private commerce could make a profit and thus be encouraged in its enthusiasm for operation. On the other hand, adjust unreasonable burdens and, on the premise of ensuring the state's financial needs, appropriately lighten the people's burden. Because strong measures were taken, the state quickly grasped the market, resisted the impact of speculative capital, basically stabilized prices, and production in the Tujia areas was also quickly restored, and the economy began to show prosperity.
4. Rural land reform
In the early period after the founding of the People's Republic, the government formulated a series of documents, including the "Land Reform Law of the People's Republic of China," the "Regulations on the Organization of Peasants' Associations," the "Decision on Dividing Rural Class Status," and the "Regulations on Land Reform in Suburban Areas," making full preparations in policy and strategy for land reform in the newly liberated areas. In the winter of 1950, rural land reform was carried out one after another. The measures adopted mainly included: first, changing the policy toward rich peasants from expropriating surplus land and property to preserving the rich peasant economy, because the rich peasant economy possessed more funds, draft animals, and farm tools, operated on a larger scale, and had higher production efficiency, and was beneficial to the development of agricultural production for a certain period; second, changing the policy of confiscating all the property of landlords to confiscating only the landlords' land, draft animals, farm tools, surplus grain, and surplus houses in the countryside, while not confiscating other property; third, paying attention to uniting with and protecting the middle peasants, which was a key to ensuring the smooth completion of land reform; fourth, land rented out by small land lessors could be exempted from expropriation as long as it did not exceed twice the local average per capita holding. By the winter of 1952, land reform in the Tujia areas was basically completed. Land reform enabled the broad masses of Tujia peasants to possess their own land and obtain relatively sufficient means of living, and restrained the gap between rich and poor. For example, before land reform in Yanhe County, Guizhou, landlords held 0.66 hectares of cultivated land per capita, while middle peasants, poor peasants, and hired peasants held 0.11 hectares per capita; after land reform, landlords held 0.12 hectares per capita, while middle peasants, poor peasants, and hired peasants held 0.17 hectares per capita. In Qianjiang, Sichuan, before land reform, every 10 hired peasants had only 1 mu of land and every 12 had only 1 room; after land reform, the per capita ownership of land and housing was 7.95 mu and more than 1 room respectively. In Dayong County, Hunan, during land reform, in addition to confiscating the landlords' land, houses, draft cattle, and grain, 143 taels of gold, 596 pieces of goldware, 407 taels of silver, 205 pieces of silverware, and 10,675 silver dollars were also confiscated. By May 1952, in the 10 counties of Xiangxi Prefecture, 268,000 households of peasants with no land or little land had received 35,780 hectares of land, 85,000 rooms of housing, 13,000 head of draft cattle, and 185 million kilograms of grain. People's enthusiasm for labor was rekindled, rural productive forces were greatly liberated, and the economic structure of the Tujia areas therefore underwent fundamental changes, creating favorable conditions for socialist transformation.
(II) The First Five-Year Plan (1953-1957)
After the founding of the People's Republic of China, through three years of arduous efforts, by the end of 1952 the task of restoring the national economy had basically been completed. From 1953 onward, our country entered a period of large-scale socialist transformation and planned socialist economic construction, which was also the period of construction of our country's First Five-Year Plan. During this period, our country carried out a series of movements and reforms to ensure the completion of the prescribed basic tasks.
1. The agricultural cooperativization movement
After the land reform movement was basically completed, the production enthusiasm of all ethnic groups ran high, and agricultural production developed rapidly. But at that time, signs of polarization reappeared in the countryside. Some poor peasants still could not escape their difficult situation because they lacked means of production and labor power, while in some rural areas a new group of rich peasants appeared. In addition, after land reform, the small peasant economy was widespread in China's vast rural areas. Peasant households in this small peasant economy were unable to adopt advanced technology, unable to resist natural disasters, and found it difficult to achieve expanded reproduction. Therefore, in order to make agricultural development compatible with the development of industry and the entire national economy and to prevent polarization, it was necessary to change the agricultural model dominated by the small peasant economy and guide peasants onto the path of agricultural cooperativization. The method adopted was to use the form of mutual aid and cooperation to guide them onto the path of collectivization and carry out socialist transformation.
The rural cooperativization movement in the Tujia areas went through the development path of agricultural mutual-aid teams, elementary agricultural cooperatives, and advanced agricultural cooperatives. Because agricultural production mutual-aid teams conformed to the traditional custom of Tujia people of exchanging labor and helping one another during busy farming activities such as transplanting rice, threshing grain, digging soil, and hoeing corn, they spread rapidly. In 1952, the 10 counties of Xiangxi established 9,112 temporary mutual-aid teams, with 47,175 participating peasant households, accounting for 12% of the total number of peasant households; they established 946 year-round mutual-aid teams, with 5,162 participating peasant households, accounting for 1.3% of the total number of peasant households. Mutual-aid teams could make overall arrangements for the distribution of labor, funds, technology, and other aspects, improve production efficiency, and because the means of production and the harvest belonged to individuals, they could achieve increased production and income. Practice also proved that mutual-aid teams were more advantageous than individual labor, so more and more peasant households asked to join them. Yanhe County in Guizhou, by carrying out the patriotic production increase movement centered on mutual aid and cooperation and promoting the development of mutual-aid teams through pilot projects at each level, had 4,312 mutual-aid teams by the end of 1953, with 24,675 participating households, accounting for 43% of the county's peasant households. By 1954, about 50% of peasant households in various parts of the Tujia areas had joined mutual-aid teams. For example, in Enshi Prefecture, there were 38,820 temporary mutual-aid teams with 251,300 participating households, and 5,162 year-round mutual-aid teams with 43,100 participating households, and organized peasant households reached 66.5%. In the 10 counties of Xiangxi Prefecture, mutual-aid teams developed to 27,594, with 132,019 participating households, accounting for 33.22% of the total number of peasant households.
Although mutual-aid teams showed relatively great advantages in production practice, they were, after all, only a form of labor combination, not yet a combination of land and property rights, so their economies of scale were still limited, and they still remained relatively complete private property rights. In order to promote their better development, the government began to guide cooperative groups toward the transition to elementary agricultural cooperatives. In 1953, elementary cooperatives began trial operation in the Tujia areas. In October 1953, Xianfeng County trial-ran three elementary agricultural cooperatives, Liaoyuan, Chenguang, and Taiping, and these three elementary cooperatives became the earliest elementary cooperatives in Enshi Prefecture. In the same year, Yongshun County also trial-ran three elementary cooperatives in Daba, Tawo, Xiyuan, and other places. In 1954, elementary cooperatives began to be established in the Tujia areas, and in 1955 a high tide of development of elementary cooperatives appeared in various places. In the spring of 1954, Enshi Prefecture selected several mutual-aid teams with better conditions and trial-ran 8 elementary cooperatives. By the end of the year, elementary cooperatives had developed to 58. By the end of 1955, elementary cooperatives in the whole prefecture had surged to 14,387, with 302,000 participating peasant households. In the first half of 1955, Xiangxi Prefecture established 376 elementary cooperatives, with 7,913 participating peasant households, accounting for 2.0% of the total number of peasant households, while in the second half of the same year, elementary cooperatives rapidly developed to 4,700.
Peasants who joined the elementary cooperatives participated in them only by contributing their private land as shares, and they retained full autonomy over their land. However, the state's policy goal was to achieve a high degree of property rights over the means of production and large-scale forms of labor organization, so as to give play to overall advantages and promote rapid economic development. It can be seen that there was an obvious gap between the elementary cooperatives and the state's strategic goals. Therefore, when the elementary cooperatives had just begun to operate and had not yet fully developed, the state was already busily planning the construction of advanced agricultural cooperatives. In the summer of 1955, Enshi Prefecture established 25 advanced cooperatives, including the Xuan'en Huonongzhuang, Hefeng Wanshiping Nongzhuang, and Enshi Xinhua Nongzhuang. By 1957, the prefecture had 2,972 advanced cooperatives, with 43.55 households joining, accounting for 93.43% of all peasant households. In 1955, Xiangxi Prefecture also began trial establishment of advanced cooperatives. Xiangxi Prefecture established 3,997 advanced cooperatives, with participating households accounting for 98.3% of the total; after adjustments, 3,897 advanced cooperatives were retained. By 1957, the rural areas of the Tujia region had basically achieved agricultural cooperativization.
The establishment of advanced cooperatives caused peasant households' land to be transferred to collective ownership without compensation, and other important means of production, such as draft cattle and large farm tools, were converted into public ownership at assessed prices and used in a unified way, with distribution according to labor. Members of the cooperative could use a certain area of public land as private plots and manage it themselves; daily necessities, small farm tools, poultry and livestock, and so on still belonged to the members as private property.
2. Socialist transformation of individual handicrafts
In 1953, China carried out a planned socialist transformation of individual handicrafts. In this transformation, according to the principle of "voluntary participation and mutual benefit," the methods of typical demonstration and gradual extension were adopted, along with the steps of "starting from supply and marketing, moving from small to large, and from lower to higher levels." Through the path of cooperativization, the individual ownership system of handicrafts was gradually transformed into socialist collective ownership. According to different circumstances, three organizational forms were established in succession: handicraft supply and marketing cooperative groups, handicraft supply and marketing production cooperatives, and handicraft production cooperatives. In 1954, Qianjin Sewing Handicraft Production Cooperative and Shuguang Rattan Chair Handicraft Production Cooperative were established in Enshi Chengguan; in the same year, Xuan'en County transformed 684 individual handicraft households and organized 70 handicraft cooperatives with 1,356 members, accounting for 90.7% of the original handicraftsmen; in February 1956, Jianshi County established a total of 52 handicraft cooperatives with 1,741 members; by the end of 1956, Hefeng County had established 28 handicraft cooperatives (groups), and Badong County had organized 31 urban handicraft cooperatives with 247 individual handicraft households joining. At this point, all counties in the Enshi region had completed the transformation of handicrafts, establishing a total of 321 handicraft cooperatives with 9,870 members. By the end of the same year, Youyang County in Sichuan Province had organized 37 handicraft production cooperatives with 1,437 members, 2 supply and marketing production cooperatives with 33 members, and 43 production groups with 422 staff, totaling 1,892 handicraft workers, accounting for more than 90% of the county's handicraft workers. Through the above three forms of cooperativization, handicrafts underwent a development process from lower to higher levels, from scattered to concentrated, and from handicraft to mechanized production, and the Tujia region realized the socialist transformation of individual handicrafts.
socialist transformation.
3. Socialist transformation of small merchants and peddlers
In the early days of the People's Republic, the socialist transformation of small merchants and peddlers was based on the principle of voluntariness, organized under the leadership of state-owned commerce and supply and marketing cooperatives through various forms, so that they gradually transitioned into socialist commerce. The main forms of transition were the following two: (1) Cooperative groups, which were led by supply and marketing cooperatives; members uniformly undertook distribution, consignment sales, or purchasing business for socialist commerce, and sources of goods were uniformly organized; sales were carried out by each household itself, with each responsible for its own profits and losses, preserving the characteristics of individual commercial operation. (2) Cooperative stores, which could overcome the difficulties in purchasing caused by scattered funds, reasonably adjust the commercial network and organize commercial labor, and expand operating capacity.
4. Socialist transformation of capitalist industry and commerce
The state adopted a policy of transformation toward the capitalist economy, changing capitalist ownership of the means of production into socialist ownership by the whole people. This was decided according to China's specific conditions. China's transformation of capitalist industry and commerce roughly went through two stages: the first stage was to turn the capitalist economy into a state capitalist economy, also called the stage of public-private joint operation of individual enterprises. The state divided the profits of public-private joint enterprises into four parts, and through the distribution of income tax, bonuses, and reserve funds, limited the dividends obtained by shareholders to about 20% of enterprise profits. The second stage was to turn the state capitalist economy into a socialist state-owned economy, that is, the stage of public-private joint operation of the entire industry. After public-private joint operation of the entire industry, the redemption of capitalists changed from a profit-distribution system to a fixed-interest system, that is, capitalists received a fixed interest of 5% annually for a certain number of years according to the total capital before joint operation. The production relations of enterprises therefore underwent a fundamental change, and capitalists completely lost the power to dispose of the means of production and the power to manage the enterprises. The Tujia region responded to the state's call and carried out planned socialist transformation of capitalist industry and commerce. In May 1955, the Jianshi County government in Hubei held a market work conference to convey the central government's policy of "overall consideration, comprehensive arrangement, and active transformation," transforming the private capitalist economy into a state capitalist economy. In January 1956, all 26 trades in Enshi Chengguan transitioned into state-owned commercial sales departments, and all 204 private merchants in Enshi Longfeng District transitioned into supply and marketing cooperative enterprises. By the end of that month, among the 3,366 employees in the county seats of the 8 counties in the Enshi region, 36.4% had transitioned into state-owned commerce; 30.8% had achieved public-private joint operation of the entire industry; and 22.03% had organized cooperative stores. Laifeng County announced the implementation of public-private joint operation of the entire industry. In the rural areas of the 6 counties of Enshi, Jianshi, Badong, Xuan'en, Laifeng, and Lichuan, among 3,601 private industrial and commercial households, 29.4% transitioned into supply and marketing cooperatives; 50.1% implemented public-private joint operation or organized cooperative stores; and the rest were also individually linked with state-owned commerce and carried out public-private distribution or agency sales. On February 10, Jianshi County announced that the transformation of 889 private merchant households and 1,036 private merchants in the county had been completed. By the end of 1956, among the 6,306 private commercial households in the Enshi region, 28.6% had transitioned into state-owned enterprises, 13.9% were under public-private joint operation, 34.5% were cooperative stores, and 23% were distribution or agency sales stores; the transformation of private industry and commerce had reached 95%. In short, by the end of 1956, the transformation of capitalist industry and commerce in the Tujia region was declared basically completed. The three major socialist transformations brought about fundamental changes in the economic structure of the Tujia region, and an economic foundation with socialist public ownership as the leading sector was established.
(3) The "Great Leap Forward" and the People's Commune Movement (1958-1960)
After the completion of the First Five-Year Plan, the Tujia region achieved tremendous results in socialist transformation and socialist construction, and major changes took place in the national economy and people's lives. However, between 1958 and 1960, China experienced the "Great Leap Forward" movement, and the nationwide high tide of "taking steel as the key link" and the "People's Commune Movement" spread rapidly throughout the country.
1. Making great efforts to develop steel
At that time, it was believed that to achieve high-speed development of the national economy, the steel industry must be vigorously developed, so the great smelting of steel became the overriding central task for achieving all-round "leap forward" development. In order to complete the task quickly, the main measures implemented at the time were to make great efforts to develop steel, guarantee steel output, and require all departments and all regions to place steel production in the foremost position; to organize large contingents and establish many small blast furnaces; to call on "the whole Party and the whole people to take action, go all out, and fight hard for four months" to complete the task; and to organize all trades and professions to "do everything on a large scale" around the center of "steel," taking on everything and striving for "large and complete" and "small and complete." The movement to make great efforts to develop steel quickly unfolded in the Tujia region. For example, Hefeng County, according to task requirements, mobilized 43% of the rural labor force to participate and successively built more than 300 earthen blast furnaces; Sinan County built a total of 163 earthen blast furnaces; Longshan County organized more than 80,000 rural laborers to smelt steel and built more than 1,000 large and small earthen blast furnaces. Because the movement to make great efforts to develop steel did not follow objective laws and was eager for quick success, it not only failed to forge qualified steel but also caused damage to forest resources. In the Enshi region alone, more than 3 million mu of forest were destroyed, with gains not worth the losses.
2. The People's Commune Movement
After August 1958, the people's commune movement was generally launched in rural areas throughout the country. It was proposed that people's communes implement the integration of government administration and commune management and the principle of combining workers, peasants, merchants, students, and soldiers. It was required that people's communes first be "large," that is, larger in organizational scale than agricultural production cooperatives and larger in scope of operation than agricultural production cooperatives. Second, they were to be "public," that is, integrating rural grassroots political power organizations and economic organizations into one, transferring enterprises originally owned by the whole people in rural areas to commune management, and adding a certain number of elements of ownership by the whole people to the collective ownership economy of people's communes; transferring members' private plots, livestock, poultry, and household sideline production to commune ownership; implementing militarized organization, combat-style action, and collectivized living; vigorously promoting public canteens, kindergartens, nurseries, homes for the aged, and other public undertakings; implementing a distribution system combining the wage system and the grain supply system; and realizing canteen-based dining. The Tujia region also actively threw itself into the people's commune movement. From the end of August to the beginning of September 1958, Xiangxi Prefecture established 4 pilot communes in Baojing, Luxi, Guzhang, and Jishou. In late September, all parts of the prefecture rushed into action, rapidly merging and upgrading the original 3,997 advanced agricultural production cooperatives into 143 people's communes, and the whole prefecture realized people's communization. On September 5, 1958, the then CPC Enshi Prefectural Committee held an enlarged meeting to implement the spirit of the Second Session of the Eighth CPC Central Committee. It held that the current small-scale and single-function agricultural production cooperatives of dozens or hundreds of households could no longer meet the needs of the leap-forward development of industry and agriculture, and that there was an urgent need to merge small cooperatives into large ones and build single agricultural cooperatives into people's communes with all-round development of agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, sideline production, and fisheries, and with the mutual combination of workers, peasants, merchants, and soldiers. From then on, the people's commune movement in the Enshi Prefecture area reached a high tide. By October 18, the whole prefecture had established 107 collectively owned people's communes and 17 people's communes owned by the whole people with state farms as the main body, and peasant households participating in communes reached 99%. By the end of 1958, 15,309 canteens, 9,125 nurseries, and 559 homes for the aged had been set up, and 9 militia divisions, 119 regiments, 835 battalions, and 3,082 companies had been established, with a total militia strength of 481,014 people. The entire region realized people's communization.
Under the people's commune system, almost all property in the Tujia region belonged to the people's communes. Although people shared resources and interests, land property rights were vague, members' sense of agency was weak, rights and obligations were unbalanced, and there was a lack of labor responsibility. The inevitable consequence was that people went to work but did not put in effort, production efficiency was low, the productive forces were severely damaged, and people's lives became difficult. In view of this situation, the state began to adjust the people's commune system. In 1961, the state implemented the rural economic system of "three levels of ownership, with the production team as the foundation," taking the production team as the basic accounting unit, fixing the "four items" of land, labor, draft cattle, and farm tools, stopping public canteens, and allocating a small amount of private plots to members. In August of the same year, it began to clean up the "communist wind" and correct "egalitarianism and indiscriminate transfer," returning property to members. After adjustments, rural production developed somewhat again. However, after the "Cultural Revolution" began in 1966, previously implemented policies such as "three freedoms and one contract" and the "four great freedoms" were criticized, rural private plots were taken back, teams were merged and communes combined, the scale of communes and teams was expanded, transition was made toward the brigade or commune as the basic accounting unit, and the "Dazhai-style" work-point method and egalitarian distribution method were promoted. These measures seriously damaged the production enthusiasm of the Tujia people and hindered the improvement of labor productivity.
The years 1958-1960 were an exploration of China's path of socialist construction. Although it reflected the urgent desire of the broad masses of the people to escape poverty as soon as possible and for China to become prosperous and strong soon, because of eagerness for quick success, one-sided emphasis on people's subjective initiative, one-sided emphasis on speed, failure to pay attention to the principle of planned development of the national economy, and neglect of objective economic laws, it caused damage to the national economy of the Tujia region. This was mainly manifested in the following ways: the people's living standards generally declined; rural labor was transferred without compensation, harming the interests of the masses; forestry was destroyed, leading to deterioration of the ecological environment; and institutional changes were too great and incompatible with local social development.
(4) Comprehensive adjustment of the national economy (1961-1965)
In 1961, after the state put forward the eight-character policy of "adjustment, consolidation, filling out, and raising standards" and promulgated the Regulations on the Work of Rural People's Communes, the national economy showed a new turning point and gradually reversed the passive situation in development, and the social economy of the Tujia region also took on a new appearance.
1. Timely adjustment of agriculture
The main adjustment measures were: (1) Adjusting the ownership and distribution relations of the people's communes, reaffirming the production team (i.e., the former production small team, roughly equivalent in scale to the past elementary cooperative) as the basic accounting unit, and implementing a three-level (commune, brigade, and production team) collective ownership system based on the production team. In March 1961, Dayong County adjusted the commune system, restoring 9 large communes and 119 brigades to 34 communes, 404 brigades, and 2,969 production teams as they were before the 1958 people's commune movement, implementing the team as the basis. In 1961, various localities in the Enshi region also appropriately adjusted the scale of communes and teams. The entire region's 65 communes were changed to 66 districts and 7 county-administered towns; the original 756 management areas were changed to 766 communes and 26 district-administered towns; production brigades increased from 2,948 to 3,247; production teams increased from 24,341 to 26,461; and all public canteens were completely closed by June of that year. Communes and brigades were not allowed to arbitrarily requisition the production teams' funds, materials, farm tools, equipment, forest trees, and livestock, etc. The commune members' personal means of livelihood as well as small farm tools and other means of production belonged to individuals. (2) Reducing grain requisition and purchase, and raising the purchase prices of agricultural products. The state stipulated that when purchasing in production areas, farmers should be left with the necessary amount for their own use, and at the same time, the purchase prices of grain and some agricultural and sideline products should be raised. In October 1965, Dayong County, in accordance with regulations, stabilized the grain requisition and purchase task for three years. In bumper harvest years, through the methods of over-production, over-purchase, and over-reward, appropriate additional purchases were made; half of the over-purchased grain was priced 30% higher than the unified purchase grain, and the other half could also receive rewards such as chemical fertilizers. (3) Restoring commune members' private plots, household sideline production, and rural fairs. According to national policies and actual conditions, governments at all levels in the Tujia areas promptly adjusted their work arrangements, stipulating that commune members could engage in household sideline production, including cultivating private plots, raising poultry and livestock, engaging in household handicraft production, and engaging in gathering, fishing and hunting, sericulture, beekeeping, and other sideline production; the products and income from commune members' household sideline production belonged to the commune members and were disposed of by the commune members themselves. After completing the state purchase contract, they could be sold at rural fairs. In June 1961, the Enshi Prefectural Party Committee forwarded the Rural Ministers' Conference's "Opinions on Several Specific Measures for Implementing the Summer Harvest Distribution Policy," which stipulated the following regarding commune members' private plots: on the basis of the original three to five fen of private plots, expand by about one mu; those exceeding this standard would generally not be dealt with this time; individual cases exceeding too much or encroaching on collective land could, after democratic discussion, be recovered after compensating with labor, fertilizer, and seeds, but could not be forcibly confiscated. From August 15-22, the Enshi Prefectural Party Committee held a meeting of county party secretaries and county heads, further proposing that in order to overcome the famine, without affecting winter sowing, each commune member could be lent one to two fen of land to grow vegetables and late autumn crops, with whoever plants harvesting; without encroaching on collective land, opening up large tracts of wasteland, or affecting collective labor and fertilizer input, commune members were allowed to dig some scattered wasteland in front of and behind their houses; labor and rest should be well balanced, commune members should be given holidays according to regulations, and after the autumn harvest, a few more days of holiday could be given. The meeting also decided to reduce the grain requisition and purchase task to 180 million jin in 1961 and 165 million jin in 1962. Agricultural products produced on private plots and reclaimed wasteland were not counted against the grain ration standard, not subject to agricultural tax, and not counted for unified purchase, but production teams and commune members were encouraged to sell their products to the state. Banks and credit cooperatives issued short-term revolving loans to assist production teams and commune members in developing sideline production. (4) Adjusting the management system, emphasizing centralized unity, so that the proportion of production costs, management expenses, and commune member distribution could be effectively handled, and agricultural production restored and developed. (5) Strengthening support for agriculture from all walks of life, with particular emphasis on industrial support for agriculture, such as vigorously increasing the production and supply of chemical fertilizers, pesticides, agricultural machinery, etc. Support for agriculture in the Tujia areas was increased. In 1963, in the Enshi region's capital construction plan, investment in agriculture and support accounted for 66.2% of total investment. All these regulations adjusting rural economic policies played a very good role in raising people's production enthusiasm, developing agricultural production, and enlivening the rural market, enabling the agricultural production in the Tujia areas to recover relatively quickly.
2. Adopting a series of adjustment measures for industry
(1) Lowering industrial production plan targets, and implementing "closure, suspension, merger, and conversion" for industrial enterprises lacking raw materials, with high production costs and low product quality, concentrating materials, funds, and technical strength to run key enterprises well, and raising the proportion of light industry output value in total industrial output value. Hefeng County, based on social needs and the possibility of fuel, power, and raw material supply, resolutely compressed industrial production; for blindly built enterprises with high costs and large losses, implemented "closure, suspension, merger, and conversion," and returned collective-owned enterprises that had been upgraded and transitioned to ownership by the whole people. In 1961, after adjustment, the Enshi region's industry and communications front retained 41 of the original 171 units, compressed 107, merged 1, closed 19, and converted 3; the number of employees dropped from 32,762 at the beginning of the year to 17,832 at the end of the year, a decrease of 45.6%. Among them, metallurgical enterprises decreased from 15 to 2, chemical enterprises decreased from 15 to 2, and the machinery industry merged from 14 to 10. At the beginning of 1961, 669 large and small capital construction projects in the entire region were sorted out. Apart from 191 projects completed and put into use in 1960 and 50 projects approved by the province for completion, all the remaining 428 projects were stopped. The capital construction workforce also decreased from 8,578 to 3,224. Fixed asset investment of units owned by the whole people in the entire region decreased by 47.33% compared with the three years of the Great Leap Forward. ①(2) Strengthening the production of daily-use industrial products to solve the urgent needs of the Tujia people's livelihood. On the one hand, in the allocation of power, fuel, raw materials, and equipment, priority was given to ensuring the needs of daily-use industrial products and handicraft production; on the other hand, actively organizing forces to restore the production of traditional handicraft products and general light industrial products in the light and textile industry. In 1962, Longshan County invested 500,000 yuan to build a factory in Hongyanxi, and vigorously assisted in power, fuel, raw materials, and equipment, greatly increasing the annual production capacity of daily-use industrial products and effectively meeting the livelihood needs of the local Tujia people. In addition, the Tujia areas also organized the production of industrial raw materials such as plastics, chemical fibers, and glass fibers to supplement the shortage of agricultural raw materials. (3) Adopting a series of reward and protection policies to restore and develop economic crop production in the Tujia areas and increase agricultural raw materials for light industrial production. Hefeng County used methods such as encouragement, rewards, and raising purchase prices to encourage farmers to plant economic crops such as cotton, tea, oil crops, hemp, sugarcane, flue-cured tobacco, sugar beets, etc., with remarkable results. Among them, tea output reached 10,250 dan in 1958. Due to the Great Leap Forward, large numbers of tea gardens were left barren and destroyed, and tea output dropped sharply, falling to 6,742 dan in 1962. Starting from 1963, the Hefeng County government proposed the production policy of "taking tea as the main focus, developing grain and tea simultaneously, and using agriculture to support tea," and adopted a series of reward and protection policies. By 1966, total tea output had recovered to the 1958 production level. Through a series of measures, Guzhang County also developed the planting of economic crops. Among them, tea was 210 jin in 1962 and reached 381 jin in 1965; rapeseed was 440 jin in 1962 and reached 1,198 jin in 1965.
3. Large-scale adjustment of commerce
Because the Great Leap Forward period one-sidedly developed heavy industry and neglected light industrial production and agricultural production, this led to a tight supply of agricultural and sideline products in the Tujia areas, a serious shortage of daily-use industrial products, and a large increase in prices. For this reason, the local government promptly took measures to alleviate these difficulties. The main measures included: (1) Adjusting the commercial economic system. First, separating commercial administrative departments from commercial enterprises, and restoring and establishing professional companies at all levels. In September 1961, Xuan'en County separated the state-run and cooperative sectors, restored the supply and marketing cooperative channel, and placed five departments—industrial products, non-staple foods, catering services, hardware and machinery, and medicine—under the unified management of the Commercial Bureau. Second, restoring rural supply and marketing cooperatives that had been abolished or merged. In September 1961, Longshan County separated the Commercial Bureau from the supply and marketing cooperative. The Commercial Bureau established six companies including general merchandise, salt, and catering services; the supply and marketing cooperative established five companies including trade and agricultural production materials, as well as district supply and marketing cooperatives such as Chengjiao and Shipai and 46 commune supply and marketing cooperatives. Third, restoring the disbanded cooperative stores and cooperative groups. In 1961, Liye Town in Longshan County separated individual peddlers and cooperative stores (groups) from state-run enterprises and supply and marketing cooperatives, re-registered and issued certificates, and established 3 cooperative stores and 2 cooperative groups. (2) Restoring rural fairs and giving full play to the function of rural fairs in regulating surpluses and shortages and supplementing the state-run and cooperative commercial economy. By the end of 1962, Liye Town in Longshan reopened rural fairs, and market transactions became active. That year's total market sales reached 2.6 million yuan.
During this period, handicraft cooperatives, supply and marketing cooperatives, and trade markets were rapidly built in the Enshi region. A total of 291 handicraft cooperatives were restored, employing more than 7,300 people. Reconstruction of supply and marketing cooperatives abolished in 1958 was begun, 598 commune supply and marketing cooperatives were quickly restored, and more than 40 rural fair sites were established. Governments at all levels conducted special studies on the issues of handicrafts and commerce, emphasizing further restoration and development of handicraft production, organizing urban-rural material exchange well, and requiring that the management of rural fairs be open but not chaotic, and regulated but not rigid. It can be seen that the adoption of these measures was conducive to the development of commercial activities in the Tujia areas and played a positive role in promoting material exchange, alleviating the contradiction between supply and demand, stabilizing prices, improving the lives of Tujia people in urban and rural areas, and promoting local production development.
In short, through the above measures, the erroneous decisions of the time were promptly and effectively corrected, and remarkable results were achieved in agriculture, commerce, as well as transportation, water conservancy, and electric power, which powerfully promoted the recovery of the Tujia area economy and created certain conditions for the subsequent comprehensive development of the local society and economy.
(V) During the "Cultural Revolution" (1966-1976)
During the "Cultural Revolution," the "Left" guiding ideology occupied a dominant position, the whole society was turbulent and unstable, economic construction fell into stagnation, and the economy of the Tujia areas was inevitably disturbed and damaged, specifically manifested in several aspects.
In agriculture: (1) Abolishing farmers' private plots and household sideline production. At that time, Hefeng County only allowed collective management of planting, breeding, and agricultural and sideline product processing. Commune members were prohibited or restricted from raising poultry and livestock, otherwise they would be confiscated or poisoned to death; commune members' private plots could only grow vegetables, not grain or other economic crops, and violators would have their crops pulled up or turned over to the collective without compensation. Fruit trees in front of and behind houses and at field edges and corners were cut down as "tails of capitalism"; private households were restricted from raising sows and raising more pigs. In 1968, the inventory and slaughter numbers decreased by 19.7% and 22% respectively compared with 1964. Dayong County assigned agricultural and sideline products to production teams or households. Farmers' chickens, eggs, rags, and waste products were assigned delivery tasks, to be delivered after the autumn harvest each year. In October 1975 alone, 31 communes in the county organized commune members to deliver agricultural and sideline products and waste products 45 times, with a total delivery value of 443,000 yuan. (2) "Taking grain as the key link," that is, one-sidedly emphasizing grain production and restricting diversified operations, criticizing the development of diversified operations as the capitalist tendencies of "valuing sideline over agriculture" and "putting money in command," resulting in single-minded grain production in many places, and in quite a few places even destroying forests to open wasteland and reclaiming lakes to create farmland to increase grain. Laifeng County's economic crops suffered serious losses. From 1958 to 1978, because they had to make way for grain production, rapeseed production stagnated, with planted area only around 20,000 mu; tobacco output reached 8,560 dan in 1952 but only 381 dan in 1961; other economic crop production, such as citrus, mulberry and silkworm, ramie, and sugarcane, was also affected. Longshan County's tung oil output reached 37,000 dan in 1958 and 35,263 dan in 1969. Because of the emphasis on "taking grain as the key link," tung tree forests were artificially destroyed. From 1970 to 1976, total tung oil output was 130,592 dan, with an average annual output of 18,656 dan, of which 1975 was only 926 dan. (3) Reforming ownership relations, destroying the principle of distribution according to work, forcing the expansion of communes and merger of teams, and arbitrarily changing the system of "three-level ownership, with the team as the basis." In income distribution, Hefeng County implemented the "Dazhai work-point system," abolished work-point rating, adopted an egalitarian scoring method, and no longer adhered to the principle of distribution according to work. From 1967 to 1970, the county's total agricultural income decreased at an average annual rate of 6.1%, total input at an average annual rate of 3.4%, net income at an average annual rate of 1.9%, and distribution at an average annual rate of 6.1%, with agricultural production declining seriously. From 1971 to 1975, the Tujia areas generally carried out the movements of "learning from Dazhai in agriculture" and "popularizing Dazhai counties," adhered to "taking grain as the key link," highly concentrated labor, and "promoted vigorous action through mass criticism," imposing more and more restrictions on farmers, and production efficiency became worse and worse. (4) Being divorced from reality and neglecting production laws. For example, in production methods and varieties, vigorously applying "one-size-fits-all," not adapting measures to local conditions and timing, and completely disregarding the geographical environment of the Tujia areas, causing widespread reduction or total loss of crop yields and making people's lives difficult. In 1971, Dayong County promoted double-cropping rice, requiring many mountainous areas with an altitude of more than 1,000 meters to plant it, and stipulated a unified time for early sowing and seedling raising throughout the county. Because it could not be adapted to local conditions, early rice seedlings rotted and double-cropping rice yields declined. In 1976, it was again emphasized that "double-cropping rice is the direction rice," and double-cropping rice was blindly expanded to more than 160,000 mu. As a result, in many areas all the double-cropping rice seedlings rotted and there was no harvest at all, and farmers had no choice but to eat state-rationed grain. In addition, the "Cultural Revolution" also involved the broad masses of farmers in the Tujia areas in political turmoil, carrying out the "rural struggle-criticism-transformation" and "lifting the lid on class struggle," which seriously interfered with the normal order of agricultural production and dampened farmers' enthusiasm for production.
In the commercial sector: (1) Criticizing effective commercial policies disrupted the rules and regulations of commercial departments, causing management chaos, unclear accounts, unknown assets, and economic accounting in name only. Hefeng County abolished the unified commodity circulation plan of the commercial department, leaving only a differential allocation plan; fiscal budgets replaced financial expense plans, affecting normal business operations; except for catering services and ethnic trade enterprises that still implemented profit retention, all other commercial enterprises abolished the profit retention method, and enterprise incentive funds were also canceled from then on. (2) Stopping the sale of traditional goods needed by the masses. During the 'Destroy the Four Olds' movement, Red Guards in Tujia areas smashed shop signs, plaques, and couplets, and the decorative items of ethnic minorities such as the Tujia and Miao, including children's necklaces, longevity locks, hairpins, and earrings, were all discontinued from sale. (3) Restricting market trade, resulting in a single channel for commodity circulation. Xuan'en County, following the work approach of 'If you don't block the path of capitalism, you can't take the step of socialism,' labeled farmers' private plots and household sideline production as 'tails of capitalism' and market trade as 'the conditions and soil for growing capitalism.' The market period was sometimes unified across the county as one market every 5, 7, or 10 days, sometimes fixed on the 1st, 6th, 11th, 16th, 21st, and 26th of the lunar month, and sometimes closed, prohibiting the masses from attending markets. This not only harmed buying and selling activities but also brought inconvenience to people's daily lives. (4) Abolishing reasonable rules and regulations. Some traditional service items and service attitudes in Tujia areas were banned as 'feudal, capitalist, and revisionist' during the 'Destroy the Four Olds' movement. Civilized business and polite treatment of customers were criticized as 'not following the class line'; selling high-end goods was criticized as 'serving the bourgeoisie'; the catering industry abolished 'private rooms' and implemented customer 'self-service'; barbershops canceled blow-drying and perming; inns canceled tea and water service and pick-up and drop-off services for guests. (5) Dealing with a large number of commercial cadres and practitioners. During the 'Cultural Revolution,' many commercial practitioners and cadres in Tujia areas were either sent down to rural areas or subjected to struggle sessions, leading to chaotic commercial management, blocked commodity circulation, and a sharp decline in commercial profits.
In the industrial sector: First, opposing the implementation of the principle of distribution according to work. The principle of distribution according to work was labeled as 'material incentives' and 'putting bonuses in command' of capitalism, which severely disrupted industry in Tujia areas, leading to lax factory discipline, chaotic management, frequent work stoppages, and a sharp decline in labor productivity. The good momentum in industrial production in Hefeng County after adjustments did not develop as it should have. In 1966, the entire county was engulfed in the 'Cultural Revolution,' and enterprise production was basically at a standstill with severe losses. In 1968, the total industrial output value of county-owned enterprises decreased by 28.47% compared to 1965, with serious enterprise losses; the loss rate was 47% in 1968 and as high as 61% in 1969. In the winter of 1976, the county converted handicraft cooperatives under each district into commune factories under the jurisdiction of the county enterprise management bureau. Industry in Baojing County was also severely disrupted, with lax factory discipline, chaotic management, and frequent work stoppages. In 1967, the county's total industrial output value dropped to 3.1488 million yuan, a decrease of 165,900 yuan compared to 1965. Second, economic command and management institutions were paralyzed. Political turmoil disrupted the normal social and production order in Tujia areas, impacting economic command and management institutions at all levels, some of which were even abolished, and their functional work was basically at a standstill.